Afghanistan- the Mideast briar patch

To understand the complicating factors of our current involvement in Afghanistan, three things are necessary. One must have a map of the area, and a knowledge of it’s history for the last 200 years and a healthy appreciation of the irony of unforeseen consequences.

For centuries, Afghanistan’s dominant population was the Pashtun people, believed by some cultural anthropologists to be one of the ten lost tribes of Israel. HIghly tribal and fragmented, they continually engaged in conflict among them selves, establishing and overthrowing a series of governments over the centuries, a no-man’s land between India and Persia.

In the early 19th century, Russian expansion from the north met British resistance from India, with Afghanistan in the middle. These two empires contended for dominance in the area, called “The Great Game” in English literature of the era. The Pashtans, in the middle played one side against the other, the consequences of which exacerbated the turmoil which has continued to this day.

In an attempt to solve their differences the British, with Russian acquiescence, in 1893 established a division of Afghanistan, known as the Durand line, which became the border between western India (now Pakistan) and Afghanistan. One unfortunate (and unforeseen consequence) was the division of the Pashtun people and bequeathing to Pakistan the disruptive and quarrelsome people which now populate their northern tribal areas.

For a time, “ the great game” abated, restarted after W.W.I I and finally concluded when the British Raj in India ended with the partition of India and establishment of Pakistan as a Moslem state in 1948.

Afghanistan was ruled by a succession of Khan’s until 1973, when a military coup overthrew the existing government of the Khan, leading briefly to a republic, which in turn was overthrown by the socialist leaning Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, which in turn invited the Soviet Union, to assist in modernization and development. Later this “assistance” expanded to help suppress a rising mujahideen uprising and by 1979 had expanded to what was perceived as the Soviet invasion. The Soviet incremental involvement, similar to our own involvement in Vietnam was perceived by the U.S. and in particular, presidential advisor Brezinski, as an opportunity to weaken the Soviet Union and give them their own Vietnam, “Operation Cyclone” was born, authorizing C.I.A. involvement in supporting the rebels, funding them and supplying them with Stinger missiles to shoot down Soviet helicopters. Now glorified by the Tom Hank’s movie “Charlie Wilson’s War”. By 1985 we were fully committed to a Soviet defeat by the Mujehideen, augmented by a variety of Islamic jihadists. After 9 years of warfare, a million Afghans killed, 5 million displaced and 15,000 Soviets dead, the Soviets left. In their place victorious group of muslim fanatics, including Osama bin Laden, which later morphed into Al Quada and the Taliban. (Another unforeseen consequence. )

After the attack of 9-11 on the World Trade Towers, we invaded Afghanistan, ostensibly to “take out Osama bin Laden. While a mercenary hit squad might have been more effective, we were committed. Once more into the breach, dear friends.

Currently, our concerns are establishing a new strategy, establishing new troop levels, determining the limits of our commitment to the current regime, redefining our ultimate goals, and designing an exit strategy, while surrounded by a people who have spent the last 200 years shooting at one another and any foreigners who happen to be in country.

In Vietnam there was a saying that the Emperor’s mandate stops at the village gate, reflecting the fact that the central government had limited authority in the countryside. I suspect that this is also true with respect to the tribal areas of Afghanistan, especially with respect to the Pashtuns given their tradition of rebellious independence.

Disparaging references to President Karzai as the mayor of Kabul demonstrates the lack of the effectiveness of the central government and will be a difficult circumstance for U.S. forces to deal with in achieving a lasting success in stabilizing the country.